being at least, we are condemned to pay lip-service to it. We admit for the sake of argument that only at 21, when we become legally adults (and not a day sooner), do we become capable of consent-and therefore of sexual choice. We go along with the argument that "you have to draw the line somewhere," knowing full well that the argument is fallacious because it implies that the same straight line must apply to all.

Why? Because our first job is to attain our primary goal: acknowledgement of the individual's right of sexual choice. To put it pragmatically, first things first. Before the Negro could vote it was necessary that he be free. We have yet to win our freedom: while we should by all means continue to discuss what we are to do with that freedom once we have it, we will do much better to concentrate our efforts on obtaining

it.

This, then, is the rationale behind our stand for "liberty of sexual behavior between consenting adults." Eventually, we will change this to read "between consenting individuals," and we will somehow-establish some sort of criterion for defining individuals who are capable of consent. In at least one state, a man cannot be convicted of statutory rape if he can prove that his alleged "victim" has been known carnally by several other men, the implication being that the experience thus gained has enabled the "victim" to understand and to decide. This is fair enough; it may be a good first rule of thumb for us in defining "consenting individuals."

Let us now look briefly at our basic premise. Should consent be required at all? Here logic must desert us; the premise has no basis in logicas stated above, it represents a moral judgment and is therefore subject to scrutiny and revision. Logically,

one

under Sade's premise, anyone should be free to violate, torture, and kill any infant he can come by, and to repeat this exercise as often as he desires. However, a man with a moderately active sex drive could dispose of 100 infants a year in this way, over a (let us say) 40-year period of sexual activity. 4000 children destroyed to avoid wreaking "physical, mental and moral havoc" upon one individual? If the one individual is a Beethoven, a Shakespeare, or a Pasteur, this might be worth while, although he could well be eliminating another potential Beethoven or two in the process. In most cases, however, the 4000-to-1 odds would appear to be somewhat out of balance. True, this is pushing the argument to the extreme-but only by pushing an argument to the extreme can we fully test its validity.

It may also be argued that a child is not harmed by molestation, and that therefore its liberty is not being impinged upon. Here we must admit to a lack of sound scientific evidence: to what extent does a non-violent case of molestation constitute a traumatic experience in the child? To what extent would violent molestation not accompanied by infanticide harm the child physically, mentally or morally? The question has not yet been adequately studied. In the meantime, however, we would probably do well to heed the old French adage, "When in doubt, abstain."

It may be noted that we have not taken into consideration the affective relation between the individual who molests and the object of his molestation. This is because basically the reaction of adult toward child may burst into being at first sight on the street, or may grow slowly. Its intensity appears difficult to measure.

The question appears to be only: should he or shouldn't he?

The answer is: he shouldn't.